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Abstract
We give new proofs for the hardness amplification of efficiently samplable predicates
and of weakly verifiable puzzles which generalize to new settings. More concretely, in
the first part of the paper, we give a new proof of Yao’s XOR-Lemma that addition-
ally applies to related theorems in the cryptographic setting. Our proof seems simpler
than previous ones, yet immediately generalizes to statements similar in spirit such as
the extraction lemma used to obtain pseudo-random generators from one-way functions
[H˚astad, Impagliazzo, Levin, Luby, SIAM J. on Comp. 1999].
In the second part of the paper, we give a new proof of hardness amplification for
weakly verifiable puzzles, which is more general than previous ones in that it gives the
right bound even for an arbitrary monotone function applied to the checking circuit of
the underlying puzzle.
Both our proofs are applicable in many settings of interactive cryptographic protocols
because they satisfy a property that we call “non-rewinding”. In particular, we show
that any weak cryptographic protocol whose security is given by the unpredictability of
single bits can be strengthened with a natural information theoretic protocol. As an
example, we show how these theorems solve the main open question from [Halevi and
Rabin, TCC2008] concerning bit commitment.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study two scenarios of hardness amplification. In the first scenario, one
is given a predicate P (x), which is somewhat hard to compute given x. More concretely:
Pr[A(x) = P (x)] ≤ 1− δ2 for any A in some given complexity class, where typically δ is not
too close to 1 but at least polynomially big (say, 1poly(n) < δ < 1−
1
poly(n)). One then aims to
find a predicate which is even harder to compute.
In the second scenario, one is given a computational search problem, specified by some
relation R(x, y). One then assumes that no algorithm of a certain complexity satisfies
Pr[(x,A(x)) ∈ R] > 1− δ, and again, is interested in finding relations which are even harder
to satisfy. It is sometimes the case that R may only be efficiently computable given some
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side information generated while sampling x. Such problems are called “weakly verifiable
puzzles”.
Our aim is to give proofs for theorems in both scenarios which are both simple and
versatile. In particular, we will see that our proofs are applicable in the interactive setting,
where they give stronger results than those previously known.
1.1 Predicates
Overview and previous work Roughly speaking, Yao’s XOR-Lemma [Yao82] states that
if a predicate P (x) is somewhat hard to compute, then the k-wise XOR P⊕k(x1, . . . , xk) :=
P (x1) ⊕ · · · ⊕ P (xk) will be even harder to compute. While intuitive, such statements are
often somewhat difficult to prove. The first proof of the above appears to be by Levin [Lev87]
(see also [GNW95]). In some cases, even stronger statements are needed: for example, the
extraction lemma states that one can even extract several bits out of the concatenation
P (x1)P (x2) . . . P (xk), which look pseudorandom to a distinguisher given x1, . . . , xk. Proving
this statement for tight parameters is considered the technically most difficult step in the
original proof that one-way functions imply pseudorandom generators [HILL99]. Excluding
this work, the easiest proof available seems to be based on Impagliazzo’s hard-core set theorem
[Imp95], more concretely the uniform version of it [Hol05, BHK09]. A proof along those lines
is given in [Hol06b, HHR06]. Similar considerations are true for the more efficient proof that
one-way functions imply pseudorandom generators given by Haitner et al.[HRV10].
Contributions of this paper In this paper, we are concerned with statements of a similar
nature as (but which generalize beyond) Yao’s XOR-Lemma. We give a new theorem, which
is much easier to prove than the hard-core set theorem, and which is still sufficient for all the
aforementioned applications.
Our main observation can be described in relatively simple terms. In the known proof
based on hard-core sets ([Imp95, Hol05]), the essential statement is that there is a large set
S, such that for x ∈ S it is computationally difficult to predict P (x) with a non-negligible
advantage over a random guess. Proving the existence of the set S requires some work
(basically, boosting, as shown in [KS99]). We use the idea that the set S can be made
dependent on the circuit which attempts to predict P . The existence of a hard set S for a
particular circuit is a much easier fact to show (and occurs as a building block in some proofs
of the hard-core theorem). For our idea to go through, S has to be made dependent on some
of the inputs to C as well as some other fixed choices. This technique of switching quantifiers
resembles a statement in [BSW03], where Impagliazzo’s hard-core set theorem is used to show
that in some definitions of pseudo-entropy it is also possible to switch quantifiers.
Besides being technically simpler, making the set S dependent on C has an additional
advantage. For example, consider a proof of the XOR Lemma. To get a contradiction, a
circuit C is assumed which does well in predicting the XOR, and a circuit D for a single
instance is built from C. On input x, D calls C as a subroutine several times, each time
“hiding” x as one of the elements of the input. Using our ideas, we can ensure that x is
hidden always in the same place i, and even more, the values of the inputs x1, . . . , xi−1 are
constant and independent of x. This property, which we call non-rewinding, is useful in the
case one wants to amplify the hardness of interactive protocols.
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We remark that in this paper we are not concerned with efficiency of XOR-Lemmas in
the sense of derandomizing them (as in, e.g., [IW97, IJK06, IJKW08]).
1.2 Weakly Verifiable Puzzles
Overview and Previous Work The notion of weakly verifiable puzzles was introduced
by Canetti et al. [CHS05]. A weakly verifiable puzzle consists of a sampling method, which
produces an instance x together with a circuit Γ(y), checking solutions. The task is, given x
but not necessarily Γ, to find a string y for which Γ(y) = 1. One-way functions are an
example: Γ(y) just outputs 1 if f(y) = x (since Γ depends on the instance it can contain x).
However, weakly verifiable puzzles are more general, since Γ is not given at the time y has
to be found.
Canetti et al. show that if no efficient algorithm finds solutions with probability higher
than δ, then any efficient algorithm finds k solutions simultaneously with probability at
most δk + ǫ, for some negligible ǫ. This result was strengthened by [IJK09], showing that
requiring some δ′ > δ + 1/poly(n) fraction of correct answers already makes efficient algo-
rithms fail, if k is large enough. Independently of the current work, Jutla [Jut10] improved
their bound to make it match the standard Chernoff bound. A different strengthening was
given in [HR08], where it was noted that the algorithm in [CHS05] has an additional property
which implies that it can be applied in an interactive cryptographic setting, also they studied
how much easier solving a weakly verifiable puzzle becomes if one simply asks for a single
correct solution from k given puzzles. Also independently of our work, Chung et al. [CLLY09]
give a proof for the threshold case (similar to Jutla) which is also applicable in an interactive
setting; however, their parameters are somewhat weaker than the ones given by most other
papers. Finally, [DIJK09] gives yet another strengthening: they allow a weakly verifiable
puzzle to have multiple solutions indexed by some element q, and the adversary is allowed to
interactively obtain some of them. They then study under what conditions the hardness is
amplified in this setting.
Contributions of this paper In this work, we present a theorem which unifies and
strengthens the results given in [CHS05, HR08, IJK09, Jut10, CLLY09]: assume a mono-
tone function g : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} specifies which subpuzzles need to be solved in order to
solve the resulting puzzle (i.e., if c1, . . . , ck are bits where ci indicates that a valid solution
for puzzle i was found, then g(c1, . . . , ck) = 1 iff this is sufficient to give a valid solution for
the overall case.) Our theorem gives a tight bound for any such g (in this sense, previous
papers considered only threshold functions for g). Furthermore, as we will see our proof is
also applicable in an interactive setting (the proofs given in [IJK09, Jut10] do not have this
property). Our proof is heavily inspired by the one given in [CHS05].
1.3 Strengthening Cryptographic Protocols
Overview and Previous Work Consider a cryptographic protocol, such as bit commit-
ment. Suppose that a non-perfect implementation of such a protocol is given, which we would
like to improve. For example, assume that a cheating receiver can guess the bit committed
to with some probability, say 3/5. Furthermore, suppose that a cheating sender can open the
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commitment in two ways with some probability, say 1/5. Can we use this protocol to get a
stronger bit commitment protocol?
Such questions have been studied in various forms both in the information theoretic and
the computational model [DKS99, DFMS04, DNR04, Hol05, HR05, Wul07, HR08].
However, all of the previous computational work except [HR08] focused on the case where
the parties participating in the protocol are at least semi-honest, i.e., they follow the protocol
correctly (this is a natural assumption in the case for the work on key agreement [DNR04,
Hol05, HR05], as in this case the participating parties can be assumed to be honest). An
exception to this trend was the work by Halevi and Rabin [HR08], where it was shown that
for some protocols, the information theoretic bounds also apply computationally.
The above are results in case where the protocol is repeated sequentially. The case where
the protocol is repeated in parallel is more complicated [BIN97, PW07, PV07, HPWP10,
Hai09, CL10].
Contributions of this paper We explicitly define “non-rewinding” (which was, however,
pointed to in [HR08]) which helps to provide a sufficient condition for transforming complex-
ity theoretic results into results for cryptographic protocols. Using, the above results, and
specifically that the above results are non-rewindable, we show that we can strengthen any
protocol in which the security goal is to make a bit one party has unpredictable to the other
party, in the case where an information theoretic analogue can be strengthened. We also
study interactive weakly verifiable puzzles (as has been done implicitly in [HR08]), and show
that natural ways to amplify the hardness of these work.
We only remark that our proof is applicable to parallel repetition for non-interactive
(two-round) protocols (e.g. CAPTCHAs).
2 Preliminaries
Definition 1. Consider a circuit C which has a tuple of designated input wires labeled
y1, . . . , yk. An oracle circuit D(·) with calls to C is non-rewinding if there is a fixed i and
fixed strings y∗1 to y
∗
i−1 such that for any input y to D, all calls to C use inputs (y
∗
1, . . . , y
∗
i−1, y)
on the wires labeled y1, . . . , yi.
Definition 2. Let C be a circuit which has a block of input wires labeled x. An oracle
circuit D which calls C (possibly several times) treats x obliviously if the input x to D is
forwarded to C directly, and not used in any other way in D.
We say that an event happens almost surely if it has probability 1− 2−n poly(n).
We denote by [m] the set {1, . . . ,m}. The density of a set S ⊆ {0, 1}n is µ(S) = |S|2n . We
sometimes identify a set S with its characteristic function S : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. We often
denote a tuple (x1, x2, . . . , xk) by x
(k).
If a distribution µ over some set is given, we write x ← µ to denote that x is chosen
according to µ. We sometimes identify sets with the uniform distribution over them. We
let µδ be the Bernoulli distribution over {0, 1} with parameter δ, i.e., Prx←µδ [x = 1] = δ.
Furthermore, µkδ is the distribution over {0, 1}
k where each bit is i.i.d. according to µδ.
When two interactive algorithms A and B are given, we will denote by 〈A,B〉A the output
A has in an interaction with B, and by 〈A,B〉B the output which B has. We sometimes
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consider probabilities like Pr[〈A,B〉A = 〈A,B〉B ], in which case the probability is over random
coins of A and B (if any), but they are chosen the same on the left and the right hand side.
3 Efficiently Samplable Predicates
3.1 Single Instance
3.1.1 Informal Discussion
Fix a predicate P : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and a circuit C(x, b, r) which takes an arbitrary x ∈
{0, 1}n, a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and some randomness r as input. We may think of C as a circuit
which tries to distinguish the case b = P (x) from the case b = 1 − P (x). Our idea is to
identify a set S for which we can show the following:
1. If x is picked randomly from S, then Pr[C(x, P (x), r) = 1] ≈ Pr[C(x, 1− P (x), r) = 1].
2. C can be used to predict P (x) for a uniform random x correctly with probability close
to 1− 12µ(S)
On an informal level, one could say that S explains the hardness of computing P from C’s
point of view: for elements from S the circuit just behaves as a uniform random guess,
on the others it computes (or, more accurately, helps to compute) P . Readers familiar
with Impagliazzo’s hardcore lemma will notice the similarity: Impagliazzo finds a set which
explains the computational difficulty of a predicate for any circuit of a certain size. Thus,
in this sense Impagliazzo’s theorem is stronger. The advantage of ours is that the proof is
technically simpler, and that it can be used in the interactive setting (see Section 3.5) which
seemingly comes from the fact that it helps to build non-rewinding proofs.
3.1.2 The Theorem
The following theorem formalizes the above discussion. It will find S by producing a circuit
which recognizes it, and also produces a circuit Q which uses C in order to predict P .
Theorem 3. Let P : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a computable predicate. There is an algorithm
Gen which takes as input a randomized circuit C(x, b, r) and a parameter ǫ, and outputs two
deterministic circuits Q and S, both of size size(C) ·poly(n, 1
ǫ
), as well as δ ∈ [0, 1], such that
almost surely the following holds:
Large Set: S(x, P (x)) recognizes a set S∗ = {x|S(x, P (x)) = 1} of density at least µ(S∗) ≥
δ.
Indistinguishability: For the above set S∗ we have
∣∣ Pr
x←{0,1}n,r
[C(x, P (x), r) = 1]− Pr
x←{0,1}n,r
[C(x, P ′(x), r) = 1]
∣∣ ≤ ǫ, (1)
where P ′(x) := P (x) ⊕ S(x), i.e., P ′ is the predicate which equals P outside S and
differs from P within S.
Predictability: Q predicts P well: Pr
x←{0,1}n
[Q(x) = P (x)] ≥ 1−
δ
2
.
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∆x
x ∈ {0, 1}n
(ordered by )
x∗
∆x∗
A B
(a)
0
1
∆x
x ∈ {0, 1}n
(ordered by )
x∗
∆x∗
A B
(b)
Figure 1: Intuition for the proof of Theorem 3. In both pictures, on the vertical axis, the
advantage of the circuit in guessing right over a random guess is depicted. The elements are
then sorted according to this quantity. The point x∗ is chosen such that the area of A is
slightly smaller than the area of B (as in equation (5)).
Additionally, these algorithms have the following properties:
1. Unless δ = 1 algorithm Q predicts slightly better:1 Pr[Q(x) = P (x)] ≥ 1− δ2 +
ǫ
4 .
2. If P is efficiently samplable (i.e., pairs (x, P (x)) can be generated in polynomial time),
Gen runs in time poly(n, 1
ǫ
).
3. Gen, S, and Q can be implemented with oracle access to C only (i.e., they do not use
the description of C).
4. When thought as oracle circuits, S and Q use the oracle C at most O( n
ǫ2
) times. Also,
they both treat x obliviously, and their output only depends on the number of 1’s obtained
from the oracle calls to C and, in case of S, the input P (x).
Before we give the proof, we would like to mention that the proof uses no new techniques.
For example, it is very similar to Lemma 2.4 in [Hol05], which in turn is implicit in [Lev87,
GNW95] (see also Lemma 6.6 and Claim 7 on page 121 in [Hol06b]). Our main contribution
here is to give the statement and to note that it is very powerful.
Proof Overview. We assume that overall C(x, P (x), r) is more often 1 than C(x, 1 −
P (x), r). Make S the largest set for which the Indistinguishability property is satisfied as
follows: order the elements of {0, 1}n according to ∆x := Prr[C(x, P (x), r) = 1]−Prr[C(x, 1−
P (x), r) = 1], and insert them into S sequentially until both Prx←S,r[C(x, P (x), r) = 1] >
Prx←S,r[C(x, 1 − P (x), r) = 1] and indistinguishability is violated. Then, it only remains to
describe Q. For any x /∈ S note that Pr[C(x, P (x), r) = 1] − Pr[C(x, 1 − P (x), r) = 1] ≥ ǫ,
as otherwise x could be added to S. Thus, for those elements P (x) is the bit b for which
Pr[C(x, b, r) = 1] is bigger. In this overview we assume that Pr[C(x, b, r) = 1] can be found
exactly, so we let Q(x) compute the probabilities for b = 0 and b = 1, and answer accordingly;
1This implies that δ ≥ ǫ
2
, which can always be guaranteed.
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we will call this rule the “Majority Rule”. Clearly, Q(x) is correct if x /∈ S, and in order to
get “predictability”, we only need to argue that Q is not worse than a random guess on S.
Consider now Figure 1 (a), where the elements are ordered according to ∆x. The ar-
eas depicted A and B are roughly equal, which follows by the way we chose S (note that
Prx←S,r[C(x, P (x), r) = 1]− Prx←S,r[C(x, 1− P (x), r) = 1] = Ex←S[∆x]).
At this point our problem is that the majority rule will give the incorrect answer for all
elements for which ∆x < 0, and as shown in Figure 1 (b), this can be almost all of S, so that
in general the above Q does perform worse than a random guess on S. The solution is to note
that it is sufficient to follow the majority rule in case the gap is bigger than ∆x∗. In the full
proof we will see that if the gap is small so that −∆x∗ ≤ Pr[C(x, 0, r) = 1]− Pr[C(x, 1, r) =
1] ≤ ∆x∗ then a randomized decision works: the probability of answering b = 0 is 1 if the
gap is −∆x∗, the probability of answering b = 0 is 0 if the gap is ∆x∗. When the gap is in
between then the probability of answering b = 0 is linearly interpolated based on the value
of the gap. So for example, if the gap is 0, then b = 0 with probability 12 .
2 A bit of thought
reveals that this is exactly because the areas A and B in Figure 1 are almost equal.
In the full proof, we also show how to sample all quantities accurately enough (which is
easy) and how to ensure that S is a set of the right size (which seems to require a small trick
because ∆x as defined above is not computable exactly, and so we actually use a different
quantity for ∆x). We think that the second is not really required for the applications later,
but it simplifies the statement of the above theorem and makes it somewhat more intuitive.
Proof. We describe algorithm Gen. First, obtain an estimate
∆ :≈ Pr
r,x
[C(x, P (x), r) = 1]− Pr
r,x
[C(x, 1− P (x), r) = 1] (2)
such that almost surely ∆ is within ǫ/4 of the actual quantity. If |∆| < 3ǫ/4, we can
return δ = 1, S = {0, 1}n, and a circuit Q which guesses a uniform random bit. If ∆ < −3ǫ/4
replace C with the circuit which outputs 1 − C in the following argument. Thus, from now
on assume ∆ > 3ǫ/4 and that the actual quantity is at least ǫ/2.
Sample random strings r1, . . . , rm for C, where m = 100n/ǫ
2, and let C ′(x, b, i) be the
circuit which computes C(x, b, ri). Using a Chernoff bound, we see that for all x ∈ {0, 1}
n
Pr
r
[C(x, P (x), r) = 1]− Pr
r
[C(x, 1− P (x), r)] = 1] =
Pr
i∈[m]
[C ′(x, P (x), i) = 1]− Pr
i∈[m]
[C ′(x, 1− P (x), i)] = 1]± ǫ/4 (3)
almost surely.
Define, for any x,
∆x := Pr
i∈[m]
[C ′(x, P (x), ri) = 1]− Pr
i∈[m]
[C ′(x, 1 − P (x), ri) = 1]. (4)
Because we define ∆x using C
′ instead of C, we can compute ∆x exactly for a given x. Now,
order the x according to ∆x: let x1  x2 if ∆x1 < ∆x2 , or both ∆x1 = ∆x2 and x1 ≤L x2,
2It may be instructive to point out another rule which does not work: if one produces a uniform random
bit in case the gap is smaller than ∆x∗ then elements in the region marked A with negative gap larger than
∆x∗ are problematic.
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where ≤L is the lexicographic ordering on bitstrings. We can compute x1  x2 efficiently
given (x1, P (x1)) and (x2, P (x2)).
We claim that we can find x∗ such that almost surely (we assume ǫ > 10 · 2−n, otherwise
we can get the theorem with exhaustive search)
ǫ
20
≤
1
2n
∑
xx∗
∆x ≤
ǫ
10
. (5)
We pick 50n/ǫ candidates, then almost surely one of them satisfies (5) with a safety margin
of ǫ/50. For each of those candidates we estimate 12n
∑
xx∗ ∆x up to an error of ǫ/100,
and keep one for which almost surely (5) is satisfied. We let S(x, P (x)) be the circuit which
recognizes the set S∗ := {x|x  x∗}, estimate δ′ := |S∗|/2n almost surely within an error
of ǫ/1000, and output δ := δ′−ǫ/1000. The situation at this moment is illustrated in Figure 1,
and it is clear that the properties “large set” and “indistinguishability” are satisfied.
We next describe Q. On input x, Q calculates (exactly)
Pr
i∈[m]
[C ′(x, 1, i) = 1]− Pr
i∈[m]
[C ′(x, 0, i) = 1] = (2P (x)− 1)∆x . (6)
If (2P (x) − 1)∆x ≥ ∆x∗ (where ∆x∗ is defined by (4) for the element x
∗ which defines S),
then output 1, if (2P (x) − 1)∆x ≤ −∆x∗ output 0. If neither of the previous cases apply,
output 1 with probability 12(1 +
(2P (x)−1)∆x
∆x∗
).
To analyze the success probability of Q, we distinguish two cases. If x /∈ S, we know
that ∆x ≥ ∆x∗. Therefore, in this case, we get the correct answer with probability 1. If x ∈ S,
it is also easy to check that this will give the correct answer with probability max{12 (1 +
∆x
∆x∗
), 0}, and thus, on average 1|S|
∑
x∈S max{
1
2 (1 +
∆x
∆x∗
), 0} ≥ 1|S|
∑
x∈S
1
2(1 +
∆x
∆x∗
) ≥ ǫ20 ,
using (5). In total, we have probability at least µ(S)(12 +
ǫ
40) + (1 − µ(S)) of answering
correctly. Since µ(S) ≥ δ, this quantity is at least 1 − δ2 , which implies “predictability”.
It is possible to make Q deterministic by trying all possible values for the randomness and
estimating the probability of it being correct.
In order to get the additional property 1, we first run the above algorithm with input ǫ/3
instead of ǫ. If δ > 1− 2ǫ/3, we instead output the set containing all elements and return 1
in place of δ. Note that indistinguishability still holds because we only add a fraction of 2ǫ/3
elements to S. If δ ≤ 1 − 2ǫ/3, we enlarge S by at least ǫ/2 and at most 2ǫ/3; this can be
done by finding a new candidate for x∗ as above. We then output the new set and δ′ := δ+ ǫ2 .
The additional properties 2, 3 and 4 follow by inspection of the proof.
3.2 Multiple instances
3.2.1 Informal Discussion
We explain our idea on an example: suppose we want to prove Yao’s XOR-Lemma. Thus,
we are given a predicate P : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} which is somewhat hard to compute, i.e.,
Pr[C(1)(x) = P (x)] < 1 − δ2 for any circuit C
(1) coming from some family of circuits (the
superscript (1) should indicate that this is a circuit operating on a single instance). We
want to show that any circuit C(⊕k) from a related family predicts P (x1)⊕ · · · ⊕P (xk) from
(x1, . . . , xk) correctly with probability very close to
1
2 , and aiming for a contradiction we now
assume that a circuit C(⊕k) exists which does significantly better than this is given.
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As a first step, we transform C(⊕k) into a circuit C(k)(x1, b1, x2, b2, . . . , xk, bk) as follows:
C(k) invokes C(⊕k)(x1, . . . , xk) and outputs 1 if the result equals b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bk, otherwise it
outputs 0. We see that we would like to show Pr[C(k)(x1, P (x1), . . . , xk, P (xk)) = 1] ≈
1
2 .
Here is the key idea: we apply Theorem 3 sequentially on every position i of C(k). Done
properly, in each position one of the following happens: (a) we can use C(k) to predict P (x)
from x with probability at least 1 − δ2 , or (b) we find a large set S
∗
i such that if xi ∈ S
∗
i ,
C(k) behaves roughly the same in case bi equals P (xi) and in case bi is a uniform random bit.
If (a) happens at any point we get a contradiction and are done, so consider the case that
(b) happens k times. Recall now how C(k) was built from C(⊕k): it compares the output of
C(⊕k) to b1⊕ · · ·⊕ bk. If xi lands in the large set for any i we can assume that bi is a random
bit (and it is very unlikely that this happens for no i). Then, C(k) outputs 1 exactly if C(⊕k)
correctly predicts a uniform random bit which is independent of the input to C(⊕k). The
probability such a prediction is correct is exactly 12 , and overall we get that C
(⊕k) is correct
with probability close to 12 .
The theorem gives the formal statement for C(k), we later do the transformation to C(⊕k)
as an example.
3.2.2 The Theorem
Fix a predicate P : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and a boolean circuit C(k)(x1, b1, . . . , xk, bk). We are
interested in the probability that the circuit outputs 1 in the following Experiment 1:
Experiment 1:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : xi ← {0, 1}
n
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : bi := P (xi)
r ← {0, 1}∗
output C(k)(x1, b1, . . . , xk, bk, r)
We will claim that there are large sets S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
k with the property that for any xi which
falls into S∗i , we can set bi to a random bit and the probability of the experiment producing
a 1 will not change much. However, we will allow the sets S∗i to depend on the xj and bj
for j < i; we therefore assume that an algorithm GenS is given which produces such a set on
input ti = (x1, b1, . . . , xi−1, bi−1).
Experiment 2:
for i := 1 to k do
ti := (x1, b1, . . . , xi−1, bi−1)
S∗i := GenS(ti)
xi ← {0, 1}
n
if xi ∈ S
∗
i then bi ← {0, 1} else bi := P (xi) fi
end for
r ← {0, 1}∗
output C(k)(x1, b1, . . . , xk, bk, r)
Theorem 4 essentially states the following: assume no small circuit can predict P (x) from
x with probability 1 − δ2 . For any fixed circuit C
(k), any ǫ, and any k there is an algorithm
GenS which produces sets S∗i with µ(S
∗
i ) ≥ δ and such that the probability that Experiment 1
outputs 1 differs by at most ǫ from the probability that Experiment 2 outputs 1.
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Theorem 4. Let P be a computable predicate, k, 1
ǫ
∈ poly(n) parameters. There are two
algorithms Gen and GenS as follows: Gen takes as input a randomized circuit C(k) and
a parameter ǫ and outputs a deterministic circuit Q of size size(C(k)) · poly(n) as well as
δ ∈ [0, 1]. GenS takes as input a circuit C(k), a tuple ti, and a parameter ǫ and outputs a
deterministic circuit Sti(x, b) of size(C
(k)) · poly(n). After a run of Gen, almost surely the
following properties are satisfied:
Large Sets: For any value of ti := (x1, b1, . . . , xi−1, bi−1) the circuit Sti(xi, P (xi)) recog-
nizes a set S∗i := {xi|S(ti, xi, P (xi)) = 1}. The probability that in an execution of
Experiment 2 we have µ(S∗i ) < δ for any of the S
∗
i which occur is at most ǫ.
Indistinguishability: Using sets S∗ti as above in Experiment 2 gives∣∣Pr[Experiment 1 outputs 1]− Pr[Experiment 2 outputs 1∣∣ ≤ ǫ. (7)
Predictability: Q predicts P well: Pr
x←{0,1}n
[Q(x) = P (x)] ≥ 1−
δ
2
.
Additionally, these algorithms have the following properties:
1. Unless δ = 1 algorithm Q predicts slightly better: Pr[Q(x) = P (x)] ≥ 1− δ2 +
ǫ
16k .
2. If P is efficiently samplable (i.e., pairs (x, P (x)) can be generated in polynomial time),
Gen and GenS run in time poly(n).
3. Gen, GenS, Sti , and Q can be implemented with oracle access to C only (i.e., they don’t
use the description of C).
4. When thought of as oracle circuits, Sti and Q use the oracle C at most O(
k2n
ǫ2
) times.
Also, they both treat x obliviously and are non-rewinding. Finally, their output only
depends on the number of 1’s obtained from the oracle calls to C and, in case of Sti ,
the input P (x).
Proof. For any fixed tuple ti = (x1, b1, . . . , xi−1, bi−1), consider the circuit Cti(x, b, r) which
uses r to pick random xj for j > i, and runs C
(k)(ti, x, b, xi+1, P (xi+1), . . . , xk, P (xk)).
3 We
let GenS be the algorithm which invokes Gen with parameter ǫ4k from Theorem 3 on the
circuit Cti and then returns the circuit recognizing a set from there.
We next describe Gen: For ℓ = nk/ǫ iterations, pick a random i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, use
the procedure in Experiment 2 until loop i, and run algorithm Gen from Theorem 3 with
parameter ǫ4k . This yields a parameter δ and a circuit Q. We output the pair (Q, δ) for the
smallest δ ever encountered. Since k and ǫ are polynomial in n, almost surely every time
Theorem 3 is used the almost surely part happens. Thus, we get the property “predictability”
(and in fact the stronger property listed under additionally) immediately. We now argue
“large sets”: consider the random variable δ when we pick a random i, simulate an execution
up to iteration i of Experiment 2, then run Gen from Theorem 3. Let δ∗ be the ǫ
k
-quantile
3Formally, Cti may not be a small circuit because at this point we do not assume P to be efficiently
samplable, and Cti seems to need to use r to sample pairs (xj , P (xj)) for j > i. However, we can think of Cti
as oracle circuit with oracle access to P at this moment. Inspection of the previous proof shows that later we
can remove the calls to P , as the xj with j > i can be fixed.
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of this distribution, i.e., the smallest value such that with probability ǫ
k
the value of δ is
at most δ∗. The probability that a value not bigger than δ∗ is output by Gen is at least
1− (1− ǫ
k
)ℓ > 1− 2−n, in which case “large sets” is satisfied.
We show “indistinguishability” with a standard hybrid argument. Consider the Experi-
ment Hj:
Random Experiment Hj:
for i := 1 to k do
ti := (x1, b1, . . . , ti−1, bi−1)
S∗i := GenS(ti)
xi ← {0, 1}
n
if i ≤ j and xi ∈ S
∗
t then
bi ← {0, 1}
else
bi := P (xi)
end if
end for
r ← {0, 1}∗
output C(k)(x1, b1, . . . , xk, bk, r)
Experiment H0 is equivalent to Experiment 1, Experiment Hk is the same as Experi-
ment 2. Applying Theorem 3 we get that for every fixed x1, . . . , xj−1, b1, . . . , bj−1, almost
surely
∣∣∣ Pr
xi,...,xk
[C(k)(x1, b1, . . . , xj−1, bj−1, xj , b
(j−1)
j , . . . , xk, P (xk)) = 1]−
Pr
xi,...,xk
[C(k)(x1, b1, . . . , xj−1, bj−1, xj , b
(j)
j , . . . , xk, P (xk)) = 1]
∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ/4k , (8)
where b
(j−1)
j is chosen as b
(j−1)
j = P (xj) in experiment Hj−1, and b
(j)
j is chosen the same way
as bj is chosen in experiment Hj (in Theorem 3 the bit is flipped, but when using a uniform
bit instead of flipping it the distinguishing probability only gets smaller). Applying the
triangle inequality k− 1 times we get that almost surely the difference of the probabilities in
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 is at most ǫ2 . Since “almost surely” means with probabilities
1− 2−n poly(n) > 1− ǫ2 , we get “indistinguishability”.
We already showed the additional Property 1. Properties 2,3, and 4 follow by inspection.
3.3 Example: Yao’s XOR-Lemma
As a first example, we prove Yao’s XOR-Lemma from Theorem 4. We will give the proof for
the non-uniform model, but in fact it would also work in the uniform model of computation.
Theorem 5 (Yao’s XOR-Lemma). Let P : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a predicate, such that for all
circuits Q of size at most s:
Pr[Q(x) = P (x)] < 1−
δ′
2
. (9)
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Then, for all circuits of size s/poly(n, k, 1
ǫ′
):
Pr[C(⊕k)(x1, . . . , xk) = P (x1)⊕ · · · ⊕ P (xk)] ≤
1
2
+ (1− δ′)k + ǫ′. (10)
Proof. Assume a circuit C(⊕k) which contradicts (10) is given, we will obtain a circuit Q which
contradicts (9). For this, let C(x1, b1, . . . , xk, bk) be the circuit which runs C
(⊕k)(x1, . . . , xk)
and outputs 1 if the result is the same as b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bk. We apply Theorem 4 setting the
parameter ǫ to ǫ′/2, which produces (among other things) a parameter δ. We assume that
the 3 properties which almost surely hold do hold (otherwise run Gen again). In case δ < δ′,
we use Q to get a contradiction. Otherwise, we get
Pr[C(x1, . . . , xk) = P (x1)⊕ · · · ⊕ P (xk)] = Pr[C(x1, P (x1), . . . , xk, P (xk)) = 1] (11)
≤ Pr[C outputs 1 in Experiment 2] +
ǫ′
2
(12)
≤ Pr[C outputs 1 in Experiment 2 and all sets S∗i were of density at least δ] + ǫ
′
(13)
≤
1
2
+ (1− δ)k + ǫ′ . (14)
3.4 Example: Extraction Lemma ([HILL99])
Roughly speaking, the construction of a pseudorandom generator from an arbitrary one-
way function proceeds in two steps (see [Hol06a] for a more detailed description of this
view). First, using the Goldreich-Levin theorem [GL89], one constructs a pseudo-entropy
pair4 (f, P ), which is a pair of functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}poly(n), P : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such
that for all efficiently computable A,
Pr[A(f(x)) = P (x)] ≤ 1−
δ′
2
, (15)
for some non-negligible δ′, and which satisfies some additional information theoretic property
(the information theoretic property ensures that predicting P (x) from f(x) is a computational
problem, and (15) does not already hold because f is, say, a constant function).
Second, given independently sampled instances x1, . . . , xk, the extraction lemma then
says that extracting (δ′ − 1
n
)k bits from the concatenation P (x1) . . . P (xk) will give a string
which is computationally indistinguishable from a random string. Due to the information
theoretic property above, once one has the extraction lemma, it is relatively easy to get a
pseudo-random generator. In the following we will prove this extraction lemma.
A technicality: the predicate which is hard to predict in this case is supposed to have
input f(x) and output P (x). However, in reality this does not have to be a predicate: f is
not always injective (in fact, for f obtained as above it will not be). Most works avoid this
problem by now stating that previous theorems also hold for randomized predicates. This is
often true, but some of the statements get very subtle if one does it this way, and statements
4While [HILL99] constructs a PEP implicitly, the definition and name was introduced in [HHR06].
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which involve sets of “hard” inputs very much so. We therefore choose to solve the problem
in a different way. We consider circuits which try to predict P (x) from x, but are limited in
that they first are required to apply f on x and not use x anywhere else. Now, we have a
predicate again, but it can only be difficult for this restricted class. However, since the oracle
circuit Q in Theorem 4 treats x obliviously we stay within this class.
Lemma 6 (Extraction Lemma, implicit in [HILL99]). Let (f, P ) be a pair of functions sat-
isfying (15) for any polynomial time machine A and set k = 1/n3. Let Ext(m, s) be a strong
extractor which extracts m = (δ′− 1
n
)k bits from any k-bit source with min-entropy (δ′− 12n)k
such that the resulting bits have statistical distance at most 2−n from uniform. Then, for any
polynomial time A
Pr[A(f(x1), . . . , f(xk), s,Ext(P (x1) · · ·P (xk), s)) = 1]− Pr[A(f(x1), . . . , f(xk), s, Um) = 1]
(16)
is negligible.
Proof. Assume otherwise, and let ǫ(n) be inverse polynomial and infinitely often smaller than
the distinguishing advantage of A. We consider the circuit C(k)(x1, b1, . . . , xk, bk) which first
applies f on every xi, then pick s at random, computes z := Ext(b1, . . . , bk, s), and executes
A(f(x1), . . . , f(xk), s, z). We apply Theorem 4 on C using parameter
ǫ
2 , which produces,
among other things, a parameter δ. Consider first the case δ < δ′ − 14n . Then, there is
a circuit Q which predicts P (x) from x and uses x obliviously in C. This implies that
the resulting circuit evaluates f(x) for any input x and ignores the input otherwise; we can
therefore strip off this evaluation, and get a circuit which contradicts (15). In case δ ≥ δ′− 14n ,
we run Experiment 2. If all sets which occur in the experiment are of size at least δ (and
this happens with probability at least 1− ǫ/2), then we can use a Chernoff-Bound to see that
with probability 1− 2−Ω(n), at least (δ − 14n)k ≥ (δ
′ − 12n)k of the xi land in their respective
set S∗t . Thus, in this case the extractor will produces a z which is 2
−Ω(n)-close to uniform
and the indistinguishability property of Theorem 4 implies that (16) is negligible.
3.5 Cryptographic Protocols which output single bits
Again we start with an example: consider a slightly weak bit commitment protocol, where
the receiver can guess the bit the sender committed to with probability 1 − δ2 . In such a
case, we might want to strengthen the scheme. For example, in order to commit to a single
bit b, we could ask the sender to first commit to two random bits r1 and r2, and then send
b⊕ r1⊕ r2 to the receiver. The hope is that the receiver has to guess both r1 and r2 correctly
in order to find b, and so the protocol should be more secure.
In the case where the protocol has some defect that sometimes allows a sender to cheat, we
might also want to consider the protocol where the sender commits twice to b, or, alternatively,
that he commits to r1, then to r2, and sends both b ⊕ r1 and b ⊕ r2 to the receiver. In this
case, one can hope that a cheating receiver still needs to break the protocol at least once,
and that the security should not degrade too much.
Just how will the security change? We want to consider a scenario in which the security
is information theoretic. We can do this by assuming that instead of the weak protocol, a
trusted party distributes a bit X to the sender and some side information Z to the receiver.
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The guarantee is that for any f , Pr[f(Z) = X] ≤ 1− δ2 . In such a case, one can easily obtain
bounds on the security of the above protocols, and the hope is that the same bounds hold
in the computational case. The theorem below states that this is indeed true (for protocols
where the security consists of hiding single bits).
We remark that while the two aforementioned examples of protocol composition are al-
ready handled in [HR08] (their result applies to any direct product and any XOR as above),
Theorem 8 handles any information theoretic amplification protocol as long as it can be
implemented efficiently.
Definition 7. A pair (X,Z) of random variables over {0, 1} × Z, where Z is any finite set,
is δ-hiding if
max
f :Z→{0,1}
Pr[f(Z) = X] ≤ 1−
δ
2
. (17)
Theorem 8. Let a cryptographic protocol (which we think of as “weak”) W = (AW , BW ) be
given in which AW has as input a single bit c. Assume that there is a function δ such that
for any polynomial time adversary B∗W there is a negligible function ν such that
Pr
x←{0,1}
[〈AW (x), B
∗
W 〉B = x] ≤ 1−
δ
2
+ ν(n), (18)
where the probability is also over the coins of AW and B
∗
W (if any).
Let further an information theoretic protocol I = (AI , BI) be given. In I, AI takes k input
bits (X1, . . . ,Xk) and has a single output bit. Furthermore, assume that I is hiding in the
sense that for k independent δ-hiding random variables (Xi, Zi), any (information theoretic)
adversary B∗I , and for some function η(k):
Pr[〈AI(X1, . . . ,Xk), B
∗
I (Z1, . . . , Zk)〉A = 〈AI(X1, . . . ,Xk), B
∗
I (Z1, . . . , Zk)〉B ] <
1
2
+ η(k).
(19)
Let S = (AS , BS) be the protocol where A and B first execute k(n) copies of W sequen-
tially, where A uses uniform random bits as input. Then, they run a single execution of
protocol I. In the execution to I, A uses his k input bits to the weak protocols as input. The
output of A in S is the output of A in the execution of I. We also need that (AI , BI) and
k(n) are such that I can be run in time poly(n) for k = k(n).
Then, for any polynomial time B∗S there is a negligible function ν
′ such that
Pr[〈AS , B
∗
S〉A = 〈AS , B
∗
S〉B ] ≤
1
2
+ η(k) + ν ′(n) . (20)
Proof. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be the concatenation of the randomness which A uses in an execution
of the protocol W and his input bit c. We let P : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be the predicate which
outputs c = P (x).
In order to obtain a contradiction, we fix an adversary B∗S for the protocol S which
violates (20). We would like to apply Theorem 4. For this, we define C(k)(x1, b1, . . . , xk, bk)
as follows: C(k) first simulates an interaction of B∗S with AS , where AS uses randomness xi
in the ith invocation of the weak protocol W . After this, B∗S is in some state in which it
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expects an invocation of the information theoretic protocol. C(k) simulates this information
theoretic protocol, but it runs AI with inputs b1, . . . , bk instead of the actual inputs to the
weak protocols. In the end, B∗S produces a guess for the output bit of AS , and C
(k) outputs
1 if this guess equals the output of AI(b1, . . . , bk) in the simulation.
In Experiment 1 of Theorem 4, bi = P (xi) is used, and so C
(k) exactly simulates an
execution of the protocol S. Since we assume that B∗S contradicts (20), we see that the
probability that C(k) outputs 1 in Experiment 1 is, for infinitely many n and some constant c
at least 12 + η(k) + n
−c.
We now apply Theorem 4 on the circuit C(k) with parameter n−c/3. This yields a pa-
rameter δT4 (the subscript indicates that it is from Theorem 4). We claim that
δT4 ≤ δ almost surely. (21)
To see this, we assume otherwise and obtain a contradiction. In Experiment 2, Let Γi be
the communication produced by the weak protocol W in round i. Assuming all sets S∗i in
the execution are of size at least δ (this happens with probability at least 1 − n−c/3), the
tuples (bi,Γi) are δ-hiding random variables. Consequently, when the circuit C
(k) simulates
the information theoretic protocol I using bits bi, it actually simulates it in an instance in
which it was designed to be used. Since (19) holds for an arbitrary adversary in this case we
get that
Pr[C(k) outputs 1 in Experiment 2|No set S∗i was of measure less than δ] ≤
1
2
+ η(k). (22)
Therefore, the probability that C(k) outputs 1 in Experiment 2 is at most 12 +η(k)+
n−c
3 , and
using “indistinguishability” the probability that C(k) outputs 1 in Experiment 1 is at most
1
2 + η(k) +
2n−c
3 . However, our assumption was that the probability that C
(k) outputs 1 is at
least 12 + η(k) + n
−c, and so almost surely Gen does not output such a big δT4, establishing
(21).
Theorem 4 also provides us with a non-rewinding circuit Q which treats x obliviously and
which satisfies “predictability”. We explain how to use Q to break (18), the security property
of the weak protocol W .
Since Q(x) is non-rewinding, it uses the input x exclusively in a fixed position i, together
with a fixed prefix (x1, . . . , xi−1), in all calls to C
(k). We first extract i and the prefix.
We now explain a crucial point: how to interact with AW in order to cheat. We simulate
the i− 1 interactions of AW with B
∗
S up to and including round i− 1 using (x1, . . . , xi−1) as
the input bit and randomness of A. In round i, we continue with the actual interaction with
AW . Here, AW uses randomness x (on which we, however, do not have access).
After this interaction, we need to be able to extract the bit c of AW . For this, we evaluate
Q(x), which we claim is possible. Since Q is oblivious and deterministic, the only difficulty is
in evaluating the calls to C(k)(x1, b1, . . . , xk, bk, r). All calls use the same values for x1, . . . , xi.
Recalling how C(k) is defined, we see that we can continue from the state we had after the
interaction with AW in order to evaluate C
(k) completely (note that all the bi are given, so
the we can also evaluate the information theoretic protocol I).
We get from Theorem 4 that Q satisfies, almost surely, infinitely often, using (21)
Pr
x←{0,1}n
[Q(x) = P (x)] ≥ 1−
δ
2
+
1
48knc
. (23)
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This therefore gives a contradiction to (18): in order to get rid of the “almost surely”, we
just consider the algorithm which first runs Gen and then applies the above protocol – this
only loses a negligible additive term in the probability.
4 Weakly Verifiable Puzzles
4.1 Interactive Weakly Verifiable Puzzles
Consider a bit commitment protocol, in which a sender commits to a single bit b. In a first
phase the sender and the receiver enact in an interactive protocol, after which the sender
holds some opening information y, and the receiver has some way of checking whether (y, b)
is a valid decommitment. If the protocol is secure, then it is a computationally hard problem
for the sender to come up with two strings y0 and y1 such that both (y0, 0) and (y1, 1) are
valid decommitments, in addition, he may not even know the function the receiver will use to
validate a decommitment pair,5 and thus in general there is no way for the sender to recognize
a valid pair (y0, y1). We abstract this situation in the following definition; in it we can say
that the solver produces no output because in the security property all efficient algorithms
are considered anyhow.
Definition 9. An interactive weakly verifiable puzzle consists of a protocol (P, S) and is given
by two interactive algorithms P and S, in which P (the problem poser) produces as output
a circuit Γ, and S (the solver) produces no output.
The success probability of an interactive algorithm S∗ in solving a weakly verifiable puzzle
(P, S) is:
Pr[y = 〈P, S∗〉S∗ ; Γ(y) = 1] (24)
The puzzle is non-interactive if the protocol consists of P sending a single message to S.
Our definition of a non-interactive weakly verifiable puzzle coincides with the usual one
[CHS05]. The security property of an interactive weakly verifiable puzzle is that for any
algorithm (or circuit) S∗ of a restricted class, the success probability of S∗ is bounded.
An important property is that S∗ does not get access to Γ. Besides bit commitment
above, an example of such a puzzle is a CAPTCHA. In both cases it is not obvious whether
a given solution is actually a correct solution.
4.2 Strengthening interactive weakly verifiable puzzles
Suppose that g is a monotone boolean function with k bits of input, and (P (1), S(1)) is a
puzzle. We can consider the following new puzzle (P (g), S(g)): the sender and the receiver
sequentially create k instances of (P (1), S(1)), which yields circuits Γ(1), . . . ,Γ(k) for P . Then
P (g) outputs the circuit Γ(g) which computes Γ(g)(y1, . . . , yk) = g(Γ
(1)(y1), . . . ,Γ
(k)(yk)).
5One might want to generalize this by saying that in order to open the commitment, sender and receiver
enter yet another interactive protocol. However, our presentation is without loss of generality: the sender
can send the randomness he used in the first protocol instead. The receiver then checks, if this randomness
together with b indeed produces the communication in the first round, and whether in a simulation of the
second protocol he accepts.
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Intuitively, if no algorithm solves a single puzzle (P (1), S(1)) with higher probability
than δ, the probability that an algorithm solves (P (g), S(g)) should not be more than ap-
proximately Pru←µk
δ
[g(u) = 1]. (Recall that µkδ is the distribution on k-bits, where each bit
is independent and 1 with probability δ.) The following theorem states exactly this.
Theorem 10. There exists an algorithm Gen(C, g, ǫ, δ, n) which takes as input a circuit C, a
monotone function g, and parameters ǫ, δ, n, and produces a circuit D such that the following
holds. If C is such that
Pr[Γ(g)(〈P (g), C〉C) = 1] ≥ Pr
u←µk
δ
[g(u) = 1] + ǫ, (25)
then, D satisfies almost surely,
Pr[Γ(1)(〈P (1),D〉D) = 1] ≥ δ +
ǫ
6k
. (26)
Additionally, Gen and D only require oracle access to both g and C, and D is non-rewinding.
Furthermore, size(D) ≤ size(C) · 6k
ǫ
log(6k
ǫ
) and Gen runs in time poly(k, 1
ǫ
, n) with oracle
calls to C.
The monotone restriction on g in the previous theorem is necessary. For example, consider
g(b) = 1− b. It is possible to satisfy g with probability 1 by producing an incorrect answer,
but Pru←µδ [g(u) = 1] = 1− δ.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 10
Algorithm Description If k = 1, Gen creates the circuit D which runs C and outputs its
answer. Then either g is the identity or a constant function. If g is the identity, the statement
is trivial. If g is a constant function, the statement is vacuously true. D is non-rewinding.
In the general case, we need some notation. For b ∈ {0, 1}, let Gb denote the set of in-
puts Gb := {b1, . . . , bk|g(b, b2, . . . , bk) = 1} (i.e., the first input bit is disregarded and replaced
by b). We remark that G0 ⊆ G1 due to monotonicity of g. We will commonly denote by
u = u1u2 · · · uk ∈ {0, 1}
k an element drawn from µkδ . After a given interaction of C with P
(g),
let c = c1c2 · · · ck ∈ {0, 1}
k denote the string where ci is the output of Γ
(i) on input yi, which
is the ith output of C. We denote the randomness used by P (g) in execution i by πi.
For π∗, b ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1} we now define the surplus Sπ∗,b. It denotes how much better
C performs than “it should”, in the case where the randomness of P (g) in the first instance
is fixed to π∗, and the output of Γ(1)(y1) is ignored (i.e., we don’t care whether C solves the
first puzzle right), and b is used instead:
Sπ∗,b := Pr
π(k)
[c ∈ Gb|π1 = π
∗]− Pr
u←µk
δ
[u ∈ Gb], (27)
where the first probability is also over the interaction between P (g) and C as well as random-
ness C uses (if any).
The algorithm then works as follows: first pick 6k
ǫ
log(n) candidates π∗ for the randomness
of P (g) in the first position. For each of those, simulate the interaction (P (g), C) and then
get estimates S˜π∗,0 and S˜π∗,1 of Sπ∗,0 and Sπ∗,1 such that |S˜π∗,b − Sπ∗,b| ≤
ǫ
4k almost surely.
We consider two cases:
17
• One of the estimates satisfies S˜π∗,b ≥ (1−
3
4k )ǫ.
In this case, we fix π1 := π
∗ and c1 := b, and invoke Gen(C
′, g′, (1 − 1
k
)ǫ, δ, n), using
the function g′(b2, . . . , bk) = g(c1, b2, . . . , bk) and circuit C
′ which is defined as follows:
C ′ first (internally) simulates an interaction of P (1) with C, then follows up with an
interaction with P (g
′).
• For all estimates S˜x∗,b < (1−
3
4k )ǫ.
In this case, we output the following circuit DC : in a first phase, use C to interact
with P (1). In the second phase, simulate k − 1 interactions with P (1) and obtain
(y1, . . . , yk) = C(x, x2, . . . , xk). For i = 2, . . . , k set ci = Γi(yi). If c = (0, c2, . . . , ck) ∈
G1 \ G0, return y1, otherwise repeat the second phase
6k
ǫ
log(6k
ǫ
) times. If all attempts
fail, return the special value ⊥ (or an arbitrary answer).
Overview of Correctness The interesting case is when Gen does not recurse. In this case
we know that C has higher success probability than Pru←µk
δ
[g(u) = 1], but for most π∗, the
surpluses Sπ∗,0 and Sπ∗,1 are less than (1 −
1
k
)ǫ. Intuitively, then C is correct on the first
coordinate unusually often when c ∈ G1 − G0 (as this is the only time that being correct on
the first coordinate helps). If we could assume that 1) that the algorithm always outputs an
answer, and 2) for every π∗, the surpluses, Sπ∗,0 and Sπ∗,1 are less than (1 −
1
k
)ǫ, then the
theorem would follow by straight-forward manipulations of probability.
Unfortunately these assumptions are not true, but the proof below shows that because
these assumptions only fail slightly, not much is lost. Informally, Equations 30-35 show that
if the algorithm fails to output an answer it is either because Prπ(k) [c ∈ G1 − G0|π1 = π
∗]
is very small (in which case this π∗ will not contribute much anyhow), or because we are
unlucky (which happens with very small probability). Additionally, Equations 37-41 show
that because we did not find a π∗ with large surplus, we can assume that (unless we were
very unlucky) there are few π∗ with large surpluses, which cannot have undue influence.
Analysis of Correctness Consider first the case that we find (x∗, b) for which S˜x∗,b ≥
(1 − 34k )ǫ. We can assume that Sx∗,b ≥ (1 −
1
k
)ǫ, since the error is at most ǫ/(4k) almost
surely. Thus, we satisfy all the requirements to use Gen with k − 1 (using x∗ as the first
input and g(b, ·) as the monotone function with k inputs), which will return a non-rewinding
circuit for which Pr(x,Γ),r[Γ(D(x, r)) = 1] ≥ δ+ (1−
1
k
)ǫ/6(k− 1) = δ+ ǫ/6k. The remaining
properties are easily verified.
The more interesting case is if Gen does not recurse. First, we get, for any puzzle π∗ =
(x∗,Γ∗) (simply using (27) and G0 ⊆ G1):
Pr
u←µk
δ
[u ∈ G1 − G0] = Pr
π(k)
[c ∈ G1 − G0|π1 = π
∗]− (Sπ∗,1 − Sπ∗,0) (28)
and thus, still fixing π∗ and multiplying by Prr[Γ
∗(D(x∗, r)) = 1]/Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G1 − G0]:
Pr
r
[Γ∗(D(x∗, r)) = 1] =
Prr[Γ
∗(D(x∗, r)) = 1]Prπ(k) [c ∈ G1 − G0|π1 = π
∗]
Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G1 − G0]
−
Prr[Γ
∗(D(x∗, r)) = 1](Sπ∗,1 − Sπ∗,0)
Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G1 − G0]
. (29)
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We bound the first summand in (29):
Pr
r
[Γ∗(D(x∗, r)) = 1] Pr
π(k)
[c ∈ G1 − G0|π1 = π
∗]
= Pr
r
[Γ∗(D(x∗, r)) 6= ⊥] Pr
π(k)
[c1 = 1|c ∈ G1 − G0, π1 = π
∗] Pr
π(k)
[c ∈ G1 − G0|π1 = π
∗].
(30)
If Pr[c ∈ G1 −G0|π1 = π
∗] ≤ ǫ6k , then 0 ≥ Pr[c1 = 1|c ∈ G1 −G0, x1 = π
∗] Pr[c ∈ G1 −G0|π1 =
π∗] − ǫ6k . If Pr[c ∈ G1 − G0|π1 = π
∗] > ǫ6k then Pr[Γ
∗(C(x∗)) 6= ⊥] ≥ 1 − ǫ6k since D only
outputs ⊥ if after 6k
ǫ
log(6k/ǫ) none of the elements c was in G1 − G0. In both cases:
Pr
r
[Γ∗(D(x∗, r)) 6= ⊥] Pr
π(k)
[c1 = 1|c ∈ G1 − G0, π1 = π
∗] Pr
π(k)
[c ∈ G1 − G0|π1 = π
∗] (31)
≥ Pr
π(k)
[c1 = 1|c ∈ G1 − G0, π1 = π
∗] Pr
π(k)
[c ∈ G1 − G0|π1 = π
∗]−
ǫ
6k
(32)
= Pr
π(k)
[c1 = 1 ∧ c ∈ G1 − G0|π1 = π
∗]−
ǫ
6k
(33)
= Pr
π(k)
[g(c) = 1|π1 = π
∗]− Pr
π(k)
[c ∈ G0|π1 = π
∗]−
ǫ
6k
(34)
= Pr
π(k)
[g(c) = 1|π1 = π
∗]− Pr
u←µk
δ
[u ∈ G0]− Sπ∗,0 −
ǫ
6k
(35)
Inserting into (29) gives
Eπ∗
[
Pr
r
[Γ∗(D(x∗, r)) = 1]
]
≥ Eπ∗
[Prπ(k) [g(c) = 1|π1 = π∗]− Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G0]−
ǫ
6k
Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G1 − G0]
]
−Eπ∗
[Sπ∗,0 + Prr[Γ∗(D(x∗, r)) = 1](Sπ∗,1 − Sπ∗,0)
Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G1 − G0]
]
(36)
We bound the second summand of (36). Consider the set W of puzzles for which both Sπ∗,1
and Sπ∗,0 are not very large. Formally:
W :=
{
π
∣∣∣ (Sπ,0 ≤ (1− 1
2k
)
ǫ
)
∧
(
Sπ,1 ≤
(
1−
1
2k
)
ǫ
)}
. (37)
Almost surely, µ(W) ≥ 1− ǫ6k : otherwise Gen would accept one of the sampled puzzles almost
surely and recurse. Thus, we get
Eπ∗ [Sπ∗,0 +Pr
r
[Γ∗(D(x∗, r)) = 1](Sπ∗,1 − Sπ∗,0)]
≤
ǫ
6k
+Eπ∗←W [Sπ∗,0 +Pr
r
[Γ∗(D(x∗, r)) = 1](Sπ∗,1 − Sπ∗,0)] (38)
≤
ǫ
6k
+Eπ∗←W [Sπ∗,0 +Pr
r
[Γ∗(D(x∗, r)) = 1]((1 −
1
2k
)ǫ− Sπ∗,0)] (39)
≤
ǫ
6k
+Eπ∗←W [Sπ∗,0 + ((1 −
1
2k
)ǫ− Sπ∗,0)] (40)
=
(
1−
1
3k
)
ǫ. (41)
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We insert into (36) (and then use Pr[g(u) = 1] = Pr[u ∈ G0] + δ Pr[u ∈ G1 − G0]) to get
Pr
π,r
[Γ(D(x), r) = 1] (42)
≥ Eπ∗
[Prπ(k) [g(c) = 1|π1 = π∗]− Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G0]−
ǫ
6k
Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G1 − G0]
−
(1− 13k )ǫ
Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G1 − G0]
]
(43)
≥ Eπ∗
[Pru←µk
δ
[g(u) = 1] + ǫ− Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G0]− (1−
1
6k )ǫ
Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G1 − G0]
]
(44)
=
δ Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G1 − G0] +
ǫ
6k
Pru←µk
δ
[u ∈ G1 − G0]
≥ δ +
ǫ
6k
. (45)
This concludes the proof of Theorem 10. 
5 Example: Bit Commitment
Theorems 8 and 10 can be used to show how to strengthen bit commitment protocols. We
explain this as an example here. Assume we have given a weak bit protocol, where a cheating
receiver can guess a bit after the commitment phase with probability 1 − β2 , and a cheating
sender can change the bit he committed to with probability α. We show that such a protocol
can be strengthened if α < β − 1/poly(n).
We should point out that a different way to prove a similar theorem exists: one can
first show that such a weak bit-commitment protocol implies one-way functions (using the
techniques of [IL89]). The long sequence of works [HILL99, Nao91, Rom90, NOV06, HR07]
imply that one-way functions are sufficient to build bit commitment protocols (the first two
papers will yield statistically binding protocols, the last three statistically hiding protocols).
However, this will be less efficient and also seems less natural than the method we use here.
In the following, we first define weak bit commitment protocols. We then recall a Theorem
by Valiant [Val84], and then show how to use it to strengthen bit commitment.
5.1 Weak Bit Commitment Protocols
We formalize a “weak” bit commitment protocol between a sender and a receiver by con-
sidering algorithms S(b, rS) and R(rR), where b is the bit which the sender commits to,
and rS and rR are the randomness of the sender and receiver respectively. We denote by
Γ(S(b, rS) ↔ R(rB)) the communication which one obtains by running S(b, rS) interact-
ing with R(rR). Also, 〈S(b, rS) ↔ R(rB)〉S denotes the output which S produces in such
an interaction, which for an honest S will be used later to verify the commitment. Let
〈S(b, rS) ↔ R(rB)〉R denote the output receiver R produces which can be thought of as a
guess of b.
Definition 11. An α-binding β-hiding bit commitment protocol consists of two randomized
interactive TM S(b, rS) and R(rR), as well as a check-algorithm RC , with the following
properties.
Correctness The protocol works if both parties are honest. More concretely, for γ =
Γ(S(b, rS) ↔ R(rR)) and τ = 〈S(b, rS) ↔ R(rR)〉S we have that RC(b, γ, τ) = 1
with probability 1− negl(n).
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Binding A malicious sender cannot open the commitment in two ways: For any randomized
polynomial time machine S∗(rS), setting γ := Γ(S
∗(rS)↔ R(rR)), the probability that
S∗ outputs τ0 and τ1 such that RC(0, γ, τ0) = 1 and RC(1, γ, τ1) = 1 is at most α.
Hiding For any randomized polynomial time machine R∗, Pr
[
〈S(b, rS)↔ R
∗(rR)〉R = b
]
≤
1− β2 , if b is chosen uniformly at random.
If a protocol is 1/p(n)-binding and 1−1/p(n) hiding for all polynomial p(·) and all but finitely
many n we say that it is a strong bit commitment protocol.
We point out that our notation is chosen such that for a strong bit commitment scheme,
α → 0 and β → 1. Given an α-binding β-hiding bit commitment protocol, we would like
to use it to get a strong bit commitment protocol. By a simulation technique [DKS99] this
is impossible if α ≥ β (there is a simple protocol which achieves this bound for semi-honest
parties without any assumption: with probability 1 − α the sender sends his output bit
to the receiver, and otherwise neither party sends anything). Our results will show that
if α < β − 1/poly(n) then such a strengthening exists. Previously, such a result was only
known for α < β−1/polylog(n) [HR08] (if one is restricted to reductions in which the parties
can only use the given protocol interactively, and not to build a one-way function).
5.2 Monotone Threshold Functions
Given a weak protocol (S,R), we will transform it as follows: the parties will execute (S,R)
sequentially k times, where the sender uses random bits as input. Then, they will apply
an “extraction protocol”, which is made with the following two properties in mind: a party
who knows at least 1 − α fraction of the committed bits will know the output bit almost
surely; a party who has no information about 1 − β fraction of the input bits will have no
information about the output bit almost surely. It turns out that such an extraction process
can be modeled as a monotone boolean circuit, where every wire is used in at most one gate
(i.e., read-once formulas).
To get such a circuit, we use the following lemma. It can be obtained by the techniques
of Valiant [Val84]. Also, it appears in a more disguised form as Lemma 7 in [DKS99] (where
it is used for the same task we use it here, but not stated in this language).
Lemma 12 ([Val84, DKS99]). Let α, β with α < β − 1/poly(n) be efficiently computable.
There exists a k ∈ poly(n) and an efficiently computable monotone circuit g(m1, . . . ,mk)
where every wire is used in at most one gate and such that
Pr[g(µkβ) = 1] > 1− 2
−n (46)
and
Pr[g(µkα) = 1] < 2
−n (47)
5.3 Strengthening Bit Commitment
We come to our result of this section.
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Theorem 13. Let (S,R) be an α-binding and β-hiding bit commitment protocol for polyno-
mial time computable functions α and β with α < β−1/poly(n). Then, there is an oblivious
black-box construction of a bit commitment scheme (SS0 , R
R
0 ).
Proof. Let g be as guaranteed by Lemma 12 for these parameters α, β, and k the input
length of g. The players run k instances of (S,R) sequentially, where the sender commits
to a uniform random bit ci in instance i. We associate each ci to one of the input wires.
The sender then runs the following “extraction protocol”, in which he uses additional vari-
ables6 ck+1, . . . , c2k−1. We associate those with the other wires in g.
7 The sender then
traverses g as if he were evaluating the circuit. When encountering a gate with input wires i,
j, and output wire ℓ, he distinguish two cases. If the gate is an OR gate, set cℓ = ci ⊕ cj .
If the gate is an AND gate, the sender sets cℓ to be a completely new random value and
sends cℓ⊕ ci and cℓ ⊕ cj to the receiver. Once the sender “evaluated” g in this way, he sends
b⊕ c2k−1 to the receiver (where b is the input to the sender, and c2k−1 is the bit associated
with the output wire of g).
To open the commitment, the sender sends all the opening information for the individ-
ual positions to the receiver. The receiver then checks if the extraction phase was done
consistently, and accepts if all these tests succeed and the output matches.
Hiding: We would like to use Theorem 8. For this, it only remains to argue that
the extraction protocol is information theoretically secure. For any β-hiding random vari-
ables, we define a random variable H over {0, 1} by fixing Pr[H = 1|X = x,Z = z] =
min(Pr[X=0,Z=z],Pr[X=1,Z=z])
Pr[X=x,Z=z] . One checks that for any function f : Z → {0, 1} we have
Pr[f(Z) = X|H = 1] = 12 and Pr[H = 1] = 1 −
β
2 (the point of H is that it is 1 ex-
actly if Z gives no information about X, and furthermore H is often 1). We get random
variables H1, . . . ,Hk in this way, and evaluate the circuit g(H1, . . . ,Hk). One sees per induc-
tion that Z1, . . . , Zk together with the communication produced gives no information about
the bit corresponding to a wire iff the corresponding value when evaluating g(H1, . . . ,Hk) is
one. Since the probability that the output is 1 is 1 − 2−n, we get the information theoretic
security.
Binding: We can interpret the bit commitment protocol as an interactive weakly verifiable
puzzle: in the interaction, the receiver is the person posing the puzzle, and the sender is the
solver. In order to solve the puzzle, the sender needs to send two valid openings to the
receiver.
In order to break the resulting puzzle, the sender needs to solve the subpuzzles in all
positions ai for some input for which g(a1, . . . , ak) = 1. Using Theorem 10 for δ = β thus
gives the result.
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